After a brief introduction to issues that plague the realization of a theory of quantum gravity, I suggest that the main one concerns defining superpositions of causal structures. This leads me to a distinction between time and space, to a further degree than that present in the canonical approach to general relativity. With this distinction, one can make sense of superpositions as interference between alternative paths in the relational configuration space of the entire Universe. But the full use of relationalism brings us to a timeless picture of Nature, as it does in the canonical approach (which culminates in the Wheeler-DeWitt equation). After a discussion of Parmenides and the Eleatics' rejection of time, I show that there is middle ground between their view of absolute timelessness and a view of physics taking place in timeless configuration space. In this middle ground, even though change does not fundamentally exist, the illusion of change can be recovered in a way not permitted by Parmenides. It is recovered through a particular density distribution over configuration space which gives rise to 'records'. Incidentally, this distribution seems to have the potential to dissolve further aspects of the measurement problem that can still be argued to haunt the application of decoherence to Many-Worlds quantum mechanics. I end with a discussion indicating that the conflict between the conclusions of this paper and our view of the continuity of the self may still intuitively bother us. Nonetheless, those conclusions should be no more challenging to our intuition than Derek Parfit's thought experiments on the subject.
1 The problems with quantizing gravity
A tale of two theories
General relativity is one of the pillars of our modern understanding of the Universe, deserving a certain degree of familiarity from all those who purport to study Nature, whether from a philosophical or mathematical point of view. The theory has such pristine logical purity that it can be comprehensively summarized by John A. Wheeler's famous quip:
"Matter tells spacetime how to curve, and spacetime tells matter how to move."
We should not forget however, that ensconced within Wheeler's sentence is our conception of spacetime as a dynamical geometrical arena of reality: no longer a fixed stage where physics unfolds, it is part and parcel of the play of existence.
In mathematical terms, we have:
Rg µν spacetime curving ∝ T µν sources for curving (2) Given the sources, one will determine a geometry given by the spacetime metric g µν -the ' matter tells spacetime how to curve' bit. Conversely, it can be shown that very light, very small particles will roughly follow geodesics defined by the geometry of the lhs of the equation -the 'spacetime tells matter how to move' part.
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A mere decade after the birth of GR, along came quantum mechanics, the new radical kid on the block. It was a framework that provided unprecedented accuracy in experimental confirmation, predictions of new physical effects and a reliable compass for the construction of new theories. And yet, it has resisted the intuitive understanding that was quickly achieved with general relativity. A much less accurate characterization than Wheeler's quip for general relativity has been borrowed from the pessimistic adage "everything that can happen, does happen". 2 The sentence is meant to raise the principle of superposition to the status of core concept of quantum mechanics (whether it expresses this clearly or not is very much debatable).
In mathematical terms, the superposition principle can be seen in the Schroedinger equation:
whose linearity implies that two solutions ψ 1 and ψ 2 add up to a solution ψ 1 + ψ 2 . In the path integral representation it is built-in. The very formulation of the generating function is a sum over all possible field configurations φ,
where L is the Lagrangian density. Unfortunately, for the past 90 years, general relativity and quantum mechanics have not really gotten along. Quantum mechanics, the 'new kid on the block', soon claimed a large chunk of territory in the theoretical physics landscape, leaving a small sliver of no-man's land also outside the domain of general relativity. In most regimes, the theories will stay out of each other's way -domains of physics where both effects need to be taken into account for an accurate phenomelogical description of Nature are hard to come by. Nonetheless, such a reconciliation might be necessary even for the self-consistency of general relativity: by predicting the formation of singularities, general relativity "predicts its own demise", to borrow again the words of John Wheeler. Unless, that is, quantum effects can be suitably incorporated to save the day at such high curvature regimes.
The problems of quantum gravity
At an abstract level, the question we need to face when trying to quantize general relativity is: how to write down a theory that includes all possible superpositions and yet yields something like equation (2) in appropriate classical regimes? I for one am willing to consider a theory that incorporates these two principles as a successful candidate for a theory of quantum gravity.
Indeed, although the incompatibility between general relativity and quantum mechanics can be of technical character, it is widely accepted that it has more conceptual roots.
Is non-renormalizability the only problem? The main technical obstacle cited in the literature is the issue of perturbative renormalizabilty. Gravity is a non-linear theory, which means that geometrical disturbances around a flat background can act as sources for the geometry itself. The problem is that unlike what is the case in other non-linear theories, the 'charges' carried by the non-linear terms in linearized general relativity become too 'heavy', generating a cascade of ever increasing types of interactions once one goes to high enough energies.
There are theories, such as Horava-Lifschitz gravity [2] , which seem to be naively perturbatively renormalizable. The source of renormalizability here is the greater number of spatial derivatives as compared to that of time derivatives. This imbalance violates fundamental Lorentz invariance, breaking up spacetime into space and time. Unfortunately, the theory introduces new degrees of freedom that appear to be problematic (i.e. their influence does not disappear at observable scales).
And perhaps perturbative non-renormalizability is not the only problem. Indeed, for some time we have known that a certain theory of gravity called 'conformal gravity' (or 'Weyl squared') is also perturbatively renormalizable. The problem is that the theory is sick. Conformal gravity is not a unitary theory, which roughly means that probabilities will not be conserved in time. But, which time? And is there a way to have better control over unitarity?
A problem of Time At a more formal level, to combine (2) with our principle of superposition one should keep in mind that space-times define causal structures, and it is far from clear how one should think about these in a state of superposition. For instance, which causal structure should one use in an algebraic quantum field theory approach when declaring that space-like separated operators commute? 4 Quantum field theory is formulated in a fixed spacetime geometry, while in general relativity spacetime is dynamical. Without a fixed definition of time or an a priori distinction between past and future, it is hard to impose causality or interpret probabilities in quantum mechanics.
For instance, in the S-matrix approach to quantum gravity [4] , one can define the transition amplitude u|S|v with S being the S-matrix whose generating functional is given by (4) , with φ = g µν . 5 Indeed, in such cases one can find (pseudo)unitarity and diffeomorphism invariance (the action is still nonrenormalizable of course).
But there is another problem. One can only perform this construction if u and v are asymptotic states, at t → ±∞. In these regions, diffeomorphisms are quite restricted, generating only rigid transformations. 6 No such general relativistic construction can be applied for the more realistic case in which u, v represent boundary states of a finite time interval. One could try to define the kernel of the transition amplitude (or transfer matrix) equivalent to (4) for a finite time, schematically (for pure gravity):
Dg exp i L/
where h i are initial and final geometries, i.e. for Σ i Cauchy surfaces, ∂M = Σ 1∪ Σ 2 , for the embedding ı i : Σ i → M , h µν = ı * g µν . The issue is that re-definitions of simultaneity surfaces -refoliations -shift h i (in a g-dependent manner), and irreparably change the (5) .
A dynamical approach Can we formulate quantum gravity in a way which reflects the fundamental distinction between space and time? One way of approaching this question is to first use a more dynamical account of the theory. We don't need to reinvent such an account -it is already standard in the study of gravity, going by the acronym of ADM (Arnowitt-Deser-Misner) [5] . The main idea behind a dynamical point of view is to set up initial conditions on a spatial manifold M and construct the spacetime geometry by evolving in a given auxiliary definition of time.
7 Indeed most of the work in numerical general relativity requires the use of the dynamical approach. Such formulations allow us to use the tools of the Hamiltonian formalism of quantum mechanics to bear on the problem. With these tools, matters regarding unitarity are much easier to formulate, because there is a time with respect to which probabilities are to be conserved.
However, since the slicing of spacetime is merely an auxiliary structure, the theory comes with a constraint -called the Hamiltonian constraint -which implies a freedom in the choice of such artificial time slicings. The metric associated to each equal time slice, g ab , and its associated momenta, π ab , must be related by the following relation at each spatial point:
where g stands for the determinant of the metric. The constraints (6) are commonly thought to guarantee that observables of the theory should not depend on the auxiliary 'foliation' of spacetime. However, as first shown in [6] , redefinitions of surfaces of simultaneity in the canonical theory can only be translates as a proper Hamiltonian flow if one restricts attention to those space-times that satisfy the Einstein equations of motion. In other words, the Hamiltonian formalism embodies this sacred principle of relativity only on-shell. And we should also be wary that the Hamiltonian formalism might be throwing the baby out with the bathwater. The freedom to refoliate spacetime implied by (6) also contains the generator of time evolution. In other words, time evolution becomes inextricably mixed with a certain type of gaugefreedom, leading some to conclude that in GR evolution is "pure gauge". This is one facet of what people have called "the problem of time" (see e.g. [7] ).
Upon a naive quantization of (6), one gets the infamous Wheeler-DeWitt equation:
where ψ[g] is a wave-functional over the space of three-geometries. And thus the classical 'problem of time' gets transported into the quantum regime. One could look at equation (7) as a time-independent Schroedinger equation, which brings us again to the notion of "frozen time", from (3) . A solution of the equation will not be subject to time evolution; it will give a frozen probability wave-function on the space of three-geometries.
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Other canonical approaches have so far similarly found insurmountable problems with the quantization of this constraint. I contend that this is because local time reparametrization represents an effective, but not fundamental symmetry. I.e. I contend that invariance under refoliation is not present at a quantum mechanical level, but should be recovered dynamically for states that are nearly classical. In fact, it is already the case that the Hamiltonian formalism represents changes of surfaces of simultaneity as a symmetry only on-shell. All we want is to extend this property to other possible formulations of gravity.
Nonetheless, apart from all of the technical difficulties, the property of timelessness represented by equation (7) should remain in any theory that is completely relational, in that it would not contain an explicit time variable. Briefly summarized, relationalism is the belief that all relevant physical information, including Time, should be deducible by the relation between physical objects. Thus the presence of an "external time" is odd from the point of view of relationalism, and should be extractable from internal properties of curves in configuration space.
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As a last remark in this section, I would like to point out that the presence of an auxiliary global time parameter parametrizing a curve in conformal superspace does not imply that one could detect a preferred surface of simultaneity. Duration is extracted from the local change in the physical degrees of freedom of the field, and should be thus completely relational, with no reference to background structures (see however the end of appendix B.1.1, for differences that could arise to the general relativistic notion of refoliation invariance).
The unique existence of the present Time is change -Parmenides and Zeno
It could be argued that we do not "experience" space-times. We experience 'one instant at a time', so to say. We of course still appear to experience the passage of time, or perhaps more accurately, we (indirectly) experience changes in the spatial configuration of the world around us, through changes of the spatial configuration of our brain states.
But if present experience is somehow distinguished, how does "change" come about? This is where Parmenides has something to say that is relevant for our discussion. Parmenides was part of a group called the Eleatics, whose most prominent members were himself and Zeno, and whose central belief was that all change is illusory. The reasoning that led them to this conclusion was the following: if the future (or past) is real, and the future is not existing now, it would have both properties of existing and not existing, a contradiction (or a 'turning back on itself'). Without past and future, the past cannot transmute itself into future, and thus there is also no possible change. Of course, the argument hinges on the distinction we perceive between present, past and future.
Aristotle was able to give convincing arguments rebuking Zeno's paradox, by conceding that there is no time without change, but maintaining that Time should not be identified with change. Instead, 8 But equation (7) has some further problems of its own. It has operator ordering ambiguities, functional derivatives of the metric acting at a singular point, no suitable inner product on the respective Hilbert space with respectable invariance properties, etc. One could also attempt to interpret (7) as a Klein-Gordon equation with mass term proportional to the spatial Ricci scalar, but unlike Klein-Gordon, it is already supposed to be a quantized equation. Furthermore, the problem in defining suitable inner products are an obstacle in separating out a positive and negative spectrum of the Klein-Gordon operator. 9 In the case of shape dynamics [8] , for the theory to possess the full gamut of spatial relationalism would require the theory to be invariant under the complete group of Weyl transformations, and not just the ones that preserve the total volume of space. Such a formulation exists [9] , but it requires a preferred time parameter. This is the time parameter which can be defined to drive the change that defines duration relationally. Nonetheless, it will be a time parameter that somehow exists outside the domain of observability, which is still uncomfortable for relationalist sensibilities. What we are saying here does not apply to the original shape dynamics theories, based on York time but not fully relational.
change was just a measure of Time, or, in Aristotle's own words: "change is the unit of Time". Like numbers, change would be something capturing an existing aspect of Nature, without itself being part of Nature. For Aristotle, Time is like the real line. However, he argues, the time it takes to get from one place to another is not actually composed of an infinite number of finite lengths of time. Unfortunately, neither parties of the argument had the tools of calculus at their disposal, with which all of these notions can be made precise. Without these tools the argument was not completely resolved, but was largely deemed to be answered by Aristotle.
But even Aristotle did not fully provide an answer to what Time is supposed to be when past and future cannot exist. Augustine of Hippo noticed the loophole in Aristotle's argument, and picked up the question. Similarly to Parmenides, he concluded that change was an illusion and yet, How can the past and future be, when the past no longer is, and the future is not yet? As for the present, if it were always present and never moved on to become the past, it would not be time, but eternity.[...] Nevertheless we do measure time. We cannot measure it if it is not yet into being, or if it is no longer in being, or if it has no duration, or if it has no beginning and no end. Therefore we measure neither the future nor the past nor the present nor time that is passing. Yet we do measure time.
According to Augustine, Time is a human invention: the difference between future and past is merely the one between anticipation and memory.
To the extent that future and past events are real, they are real now, i.e. they are somehow encoded in the present configuration of the Universe. Apart from that, they can be argued not to exist. My memory of the donut I had for breakfast is etched into patterns of electric and chemical configurations of my brain, right now. We infer the past existence of dinosaurs because it is encoded in the genes of present species and in fossils in the soil. In a timeless Universe, what we actually do is deduce from the present that there exists a continuous curve of configurations connecting 'now' to some event in the past. But if the ideas of past and future were all false, how would we have come to have such illusions in the first place? They surely are not false, and other instants should exist. But then how to connect a snapshot of the dinosaur dying with the snapshot of the archaeologist finding its remains? Does the Eleatic argument bring about a 'solipsism of the instant' ?
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A more mathematical posing of the question. Let's call configuration space M, which we endow with a reasonable topology (see the relevant subsection in 4). Given an appropriate action functional over M, one obtains continuous curves that extremize this functional. It makes sense to have configuration 'bite on donut' connected by one such continuous curve to configuration 'me, reminiscing about donut, six hours later'. But what is the meaning of these curves? In which sense can we think of ourselves as traversing them?
We now turn to the meaning of timeless configuration space, and how to construct a theory of quantum gravity there.
Timelessness quantum mechanics in configuration space
What does a timeless, relational theory, quantum or classical, look like? A long literature exists on this matter, and it is of course beyond the scope of this work to give any reasonably detailed account of the subject. Instead, I will give a very brief account of the results of [10] , which are specially useful for my purposes. Chiou translates canonical timeless quantum mechanics (see e.g. [11] , briefly summarized in appendix A) into the path integral formulation -which is the approach I believe carries the most useful conceptual baggage.
Timeless path integral in quantum mechanics
We start with a finite-dimensional system, whose configuration space, M, is coordinitized by q a , for a = 1, · · · , n. An observation yields a complete set of q a , which is called an event. Let us start by making it clear that no coordinate, or function of coordinates, need single itself out as a reference parameter of curves in M. The systems we are considering are not necessarily 'deparametrizable' -they do not necessarily possess a suitable notion of time variable. Now let Ω = T * M be the cotangent bundle to configuration space, with coordinates q a and their momenta p a . The classical dynamics of a reparametrization invariant system is fully determined once one fixes the Hamiltonian constraint surface in Ω, given by H = 0. A curve γ ∈ M is a classical history connecting the events q a 1 and q a 2 if there exists an unparametrized curveγ in T * M such that the following action is extremized:
for curves lying on the constraint surface H(q a , p a ) = 0, and are such thatγ's projection to M is γ, connecting q a 1 and q a 2 . Feynman's original demonstration of the equivalence between the standard form of non-relativistic quantum mechanics and his own path integral formulation relied on refining time slicings, which gave a straightforward manner by which to partition paths into smaller and smaller segments. Without absolute time, one must employ new tools in seeking to show the equivalence. For instance, a parametrized curvē γ : [0, 1] → Ω need not be injective on its image (it may go back and forth). This requires one to use a Riemann-Stieltjes integral as opposed to a Riemann one in order to make sense of the limiting procedure to infinite sub-divisions of the parametrization. Furthermore, one must then sum over all parametrizations, at which point the integral over τ in (24) ends up indeed giving a functional δ[H], and the entire transition amplitude (23) becomes:
where the path integral sums over paths whose projection starts at q 1 and ends at q 2 . In the presence of gauge symmetries, if it is the case that these symmetries form a closed Lie algebra, one can in principle use the group averaging procedure mentioned in appendix A, provided one uses a similarly translation invariant measure of integration. For a strictly deparametrizable system, 11 one obtains again:
up to an irrelevant overall factor. Further, if the Hamiltonian is quadratic in the momenta, one can integrate them out and obtain the configuration space path integral with the Lagrangian form of the action.
The absence of change. For a theory that contains some driver of change, an absolute Time of some sort, we would extend our configuration space with an independent time variable, t, making the system effectively deparametrizable. With this absolute notion of Time, and ontological deparametrization of the system, evolution from t 1 to t 2 would not require any further definition. At this point we could stop, claiming that we have expounded on what we expect a relational theory of space to look like. We would be able to define a Schrodinger equation much as in the usual time-dependent framework, and go about our business. Shape dynamics employing the complete relational symmetries is a theory of that sort. 12 However, the presence of Time there is still disturbing from a relational point of view: where is this Time if not in the relations between elements of the configurations? Therefore, to fully satisfy our relational fantasies, we must again tackle the question posed at the introduction: without a driver for change, what is the meaning of a transition amplitude?
In the path integral representation of the timeless transition amplitude, W (q 1 , q 2 ) depends only on the configuration variables (momenta are being integrated over), and it again is not clear what ontological meaning to give to W (q 1 , q 2 ) by itself. I will require symmetries to be 'laws of the instant' precisely so that they are compatible with a theory defined at its most fundamental level by W (q 1 , q 2 ).
Timeless quantum gravity
In the last section, I reviewed a timeless path integral formulation of quantum mechanics by Chiou [10] , building on previous results on timeless quantum mechanics (see [11] for a review). In these formulations, configuration space is the 'space of all possible instants'. This section will consist of a (extremely) summarized account of my work in [13, 14, 15] .
Configuration space for timeless field theories, which I will still denote by M, is the set of all possible field configurations over a given (in our case finite-dimensional, closed) manifold M . Each point of configuration space q ∈ M is a "snapshot" of the whole Universe. 13 One nice thing about this infinitedimensional space is that it is metrizable, which gives it the minimal topological properties we want from the requirements of section 4.
Symmetries, relationalism and 'laws of the instant'
Relationalism In Hamiltonian language, the most general symmetry transformation acts through the Poisson bracket on configurations as
where is the gauge parameter, which in this infinite dimensional context is a function on M (not necessarily scalar), and we are using DeWitt's mixed functional dependence, i.e. F depends functionally on g ij (not just on its value at x ), as denoted by square brackets, but it yields a function with position dependence -the " ; x )" at the end.
Regarding the presence of gauge symmetries in configuration space, we would like to implement the most general relational principles that are applicable to space (as opposed to spacetime). At face value, the strictly relational symmetries should be:
• Relationalism of locations. In Newtonian particle mechanics this would imply that to predict the future behaviour of a system one requires the initial relative positions and velocities of the particles, not their absolute position and motion. It only holds if the total angular momentum of the system vanishes (see [16, 17] ). In the gravitational field theory case, this property is represented by the (spatial) diffeomorphism group of the manifold M , Diff(M ). This symmetry is generated by
• Relationalism of scale. In Newtonian particle mechanics this would imply that to predict the future behaviour of a system one furthermore requires only the relative distance of the particles, not the absolute scale. It only holds if the total dilatational momentum of the system vanishes (see [16, 17] ). In the gravitational field theory this property is represented by the group of scale transformations (also called the Weyl group), C(M ). This symmetry is generated by F [g, π; x ) = g ij π ij (x), which yields on configuration space δ g ij (x) = (x)g ij (x). In this case the gauge parameter is a scalar function, as opposed to a vector field for the diffeomorphisms.
Unlike what is the case with the constraints emerging from the Hamiltonian ADM formalism of general relativity, these symmetries form a (infinite-dimensional) closed Lie algebra.
Laws of the instant Even disregarding considerations about relationalism, as we saw in section 1.2, the issue with a finite-time gravitational transition amplitude, equation (5), is that local reparametrizations, or refoliations, don't act as a group in spatial configuration space, and thus do not allow one to form a "gauge-invariant' quotient from its action. One of the aims of the paper will be to find a fomulation of quantum gravity for which we can have a well-posed transition amplitude for states that are not infinitely "far apart" -after all, even the notion of "far apart" should emerge from expectation values.
We would also like symmetries to act solely on configuration space, in a manner compatible with the demand that W (g
give all the information we need about a theory. To be compatible with presentism, I thus require that δ g
In other words, the action of the symmetry transformations of 'now', only depend on the content of 'now'. The action of these relational symmetries on each configuration is self-determined, they do not depend on tangent vectors v 1 ∈ T g 1 M or on configurations g 3 ij different than the ones the symmetries are acting upon. In appendix B, I sketch a proof that the relational symmetries of scale and position are indeed the only symmetries whose action in phase space projects down to an intrinsic action on configuration space.
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The conclusion of this argument is that spatial relationalism is singled out by demanding that symmetries have an intrinsic action on configuration space. This feature is not realized by the action of the ADM scalar constraint (6), since it is a symmetry generated by terms quadratic in the momenta. Thus the transformation it generates on the metric requires knowledge of the conjugate momentum (and vice-versa).
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Lastly (and also unlike what is the case with the scalar constraint (6)), barring the occurrence of metrics with non-trivial isometry group, the action of these symmetries endows configuration space M with a well-defined, neat principal fiber bundle structure (see [?] ), which enables their quantum treatment [15] .
Given these symmetries (and the principal fiber bundle structure they form), we take the analogous of (9), schematically projected down onto the space of conformal geometries 16 :
where I have (again, schematically) used square brackets to denote the conformal-diffeo equivalence classes of the metric and momenta. In appendix A, we show how probabilities can then be calculated using the analogue of (26) . Still, even in the classical limit, there is a fundamental difference between the notion of duration in a spatially relational theory -such as the ones defined in appendix B in equations (32) and (34), which are to be input into (11) -and duration in a spacetime theory such as GR in its ADM form. In a 3+1 description of GR, given an initial and a final Cauchy surfaces and a unique spacetime interpolating between the two, duration along a world-line is read off from the lapse associated to that foliation. In (32) and (34) there is no inkling of a lapse anywhere to be seen. For a given unique extremal field history between [g 1 ] and [g 2 ], one must then define duration as a local measure of change in the conformal geometry. In this case, duration along a worldline is completely relational, and does not set a scale by itself, unlike what is the case in GR.
Records and timelessness
In a true spatially relational theory, an instantaneous state of an observer is encoded in a partial field configuration. There are no subjective overtones attributed to an observer -it is merely a (partial) state of the fields. Of course, there are many regions of configuration space where no such thing as an observer will be represented.
Since each point is a possible 'now', and there is no evolution, each 'now' has an equal claim on existing. This establishes the plane of existence, every 'now' that can exist, does exist! We are at least partway towards the adage of quantum mechanics. If this was a discrete space, we could say that each element has the same weight. This is known as the principle of indifference and it implies that we count each copy of a similar observer once.
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But configuration space is a continuous space, like R 2 (but infinite-dimensional). Unlike what is the case with discrete spaces, there is no preferred way of counting points of R 2 . We need to imprint M with a volume form; each volume form represents a different way of counting configurations.
14 This is not entirely true. There is the possibility of a third constraint, π ab = 0. This constraint would subsume the other two, and imposing it would imply that indeed we live in a static, Eleatic Universe. 15 Similarly, the action of these relational symmetries also act independently on the momenta, i.e. their action splits, and finite gauge transformations can be written schematically, in the form:
where exp dτ ξ(τ ) represents the flow of the vector field part of ξ(t) and the usual exponential of an infinitesimal Weyl transformation, and the · denotes the respective group action, e.g.: for the metric, pull-back for the diffeomorphisms and pointwise multiplication for Weyl, [18] ). 16 The full treatment of the gauge conditions requires a gauge-fixed BRST formalism, which is a level of detail I don't need here. See [15] for a more precise definition, equation (28), where we use
. 17 The intuition obtained for Many Worlds in the discrete configuration spaces can be misleading for our purposes. In that case, each 'branch' can be counted, and one needs a further explanation to count them according to the Born rule. Based on this principle, and on the Epistemic Principle of Separability, Carroll et al claim that the Born rule can be derived [19] .
Born rule and the preferred configuration. Contrary to what occurs in standard time-dependent Many Worlds quantum mechanics, I will define a single, standard time-independent 'volume element' over configuration space M. Integrated over a given region, this volume element will simply give the volume, or the amount, of configurations in that region.
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The volume form P ([g])D[g] is defined as a positive scalar function of the transition amplitude,
, where F : C → R + with the extra property that it preserves the multiplicative group structure,
an important property to recover locality and an empiric notion of records from the transition amplitude [13] . This measure, F , gives a way to "count" configurations, and it is assumed to act as a positive functional of the only non-trivial function we have defined on M, namely, the transition amplitude W (q * , q). Together with certain locality properties of W (q * , q) discussed in [13] , and the factorization property of records (16) below, my hope is that (12) will uniquely lead to a derivation of the Born rule in the future. Now, for simplicity of notation, let us denote the equivalence classes [g] by the former coordinate variable, q, and just assume that F (W (q * , q)) = |W (q * , q)| 2 , i.e.
Still, in the definition of P (q) I have sneaked in a 'in' configuration, q * , which defines once and for all the static volume form over (reduced) configuration space. I define q * roughly as the simplest, most structureless configuration of the fields in question.
The preferred configuration, q * . This might sound subjective, but in fact it is not. Reduced configuration spaces may not form smooth manifolds, but only what are called stratified manifolds, in general. This is because the symmetry group in question -whose action forms the equivalence relation by which we are quotienting -may act qualitatively differently on different orbits. If there are subgroups of the symmetry group, called stabilizer subgroups, whose action leave a point fixed, the symmetry does not act "fully" on said point (or rather, on the orbit corresponding to the point). Thus the quotient of configuration space wrt to the symmetry may vary in dimensionality.
Taking the quotient by such wavering actions of the symmetry group creates a patchwork of manifolds, whose union is called a stratified manifold. It is a space that has nested "corners" -each stratum has as boundaries a lesser dimensional stratum, and is indexed by the stabilizer subgroup of the symmetry group in question (e.g. isometries as a subgroup of Diff(M)). The larger the stabilizer group, the lower the strata. A useful picture to have in mind for this structure is a cube (seen as a manifold with boundaries). The interior of the cube has boundaries which decomposes into faces, whose boundaries decompose into lines, whose boundaries decompose into points. The higher the dimension of the boundary component, the smaller the isometry group that its constituents have. 19 Thus the interior of the cube might have no stabilizer subgroups associated to it, the face of the cube could be associated to a lower dimensional stabilizer subgroup than the edges, and the edges a lower one than the corners.
Configurations with the highest possible dimension of the stabilizer subgroup are what I define as q * -they are the pointiest corners of reduced configuration space! And it is these preferred singular points of configuration space that we define as an origin of the transition amplitude. Thus, depending on the symmetries acting of configuration space, and on the topology of M , one can have different such preferred configurations. For the case at hand -in which we have both scale and diffeomorphism symmetry and M = S 3 -there exists a unique such preferred point! The preferred q * of M/(Diff(M ) C) is the one corresponding to the round sphere.
Semi-classical records: recovering Time But, the astute reader may ask, having already defined q * , we can set it as q 1 and obtain a meaningful transition amplitude W (q 1 , q 2 ) to 'now', represented by 18 Of course, these volume forms are divergent and technically difficult to define. Properties of locality of the volume form, discussed in [13] are essential to show that nonetheless their definition reduces to the usual Born rule for isolated finite-dimensional systems. Furthermore, only ratios of the volume form have any meaning, and only in a Bayesian interpretation.
19 E.g. let Mo be the set of metrics without isometries. This is a dense and open subset of M, the space of smooth metrics over M . Let In be the isometry group of the metrics gn, such that the dimension of In is dn. Then the quotient space of metrics with isometry group In forms a manifold with boundaries, Mn/Diff(M ) = Sn. The boundary of Sn decomposes into the union of S n for n > n (see [20] ). q 2 ? Yes, we can. At a fundamental level, q * , together with a definition of F and the action, completely specify the physical content of the theory by giving the volume of configurations in a given region of M.
But, if another class of object which I call records, exists, then one can more realistically model our practice of the scientific method. For after all, in our everyday laboratory usage of quantum mechanics, we don't calculate the transition amplitude to the origin of the Universe. Instead, one calculates the transition amplitude with respect to some not-too-distant initial conditions, some nearby 'in' state, q 1 . The existence of records, embedded in the present configuration q, formalizes this notion. It makes sense out of amplitudes between a record and a record-holding configuration, leaving the actual amplitude between the record and the 'origin', q * , redundant. The system one should have in mind as an example of such a structure is the Mott bubble chamber [21] . In it, emitted particles from α-decay in a cloud chamber condense bubbles along their trajectories. A quantum mechanical treatment involving a timeless Schroedinger equation finds that the wave-function peaks on configurations for which bubbles are formed collinearly with the source of the α-decay. In this analogy, a 'record holding configuration' would be any configuration with n collinear condensed bubbles, and any configuration with n ≤ n condensed bubbles along the same direction would be the respective 'record configuration'. In other words, the n + 1-collinear bubbles configuration holds a record of the nbubbles one. For example, to leading order, the probability amplitude for n bubbles along the θ direction obeys
where n < n, and P [A|B] is the conditional probability for B given A. Let us sketch how this comes about in the present context. When semi-classical approximations may be made for the transition amplitude between q * and a given configuration, we have
where the γ j are curves that extremize the action and ∆ are certain weights for each one. Roughly speaking, when all of γ j go through a configuration q r = q, I will define q as possessing a semi-classical record of q r . Note that this is a statement about q, i.e. it is q that contains the record.
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Indeed, for records, it can be shown that the amplitude suffers a decomposition (this is shown in [14] , and works also for strings of records)
To show this, one uses the same techniques as to show that the usual semi-classical transition amplitude has the semi-group property:
In a simplified case of a system deparametrizable around the components t r 2 of the record configurations, we immediately recover
and for a single record we recover (16) . Calculating the probability of q from equation (16), we get an equation of conditional probability, of q on q r , P (q r ) = P (q|q r )P (q r )
Equation (18) thus reproduces the Mott bubble equation, (14) .
If records are present, it would make absolute sense for 'observers' in q to attribute some of its properties to the 'previous existence' of q r . It is as if configuration q r had to 'happen' in order that q came into existence. If q has some notion of history, q r participated in it.
When comparing relative amplitudes between possibly finding yourself in configurations q 1 or q 2 , both possessing the same records, the amplitude W (q * , q r ) factors out, becoming irrelevant. We don't need to remember what the origin of the Universe was, when doing experiments in the lab.
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20 A more precise definition of records using semi-classical coarse-grainings is left for the appendix C, definition 2. 21 But note that whenever a record exists, the preferred configuration q * is also a record. In fact, one could have defined it as the record, of all of configuration space. Indeed, it does have the properties of being as unstructured as possible, which we would not be amiss in taking to characterize an origin of the Universe.
Records and conservation of probability Now, one of the main questions that started our exploration of theories that are characterized by the timeless transition amplitude, was the difficulty in defining concepts such as conservation of probability for theories such as quantum gravity, which have no fixed causal structure. Are we in a better position now? Yes.
Redefining
, and taking ψ(φ) := A W (φ * , φ)
the static wave-function over configuration space, we have:
where V (M) is the volume of configuration space according to the projection of the Liouville measure and we used the composition property of the path integral in the third equality. Thus, as long as we
and thus, for M (r) the space of configurations with records of φ r , for which ψ(φ) =
1
A ψ(φ r )W (φ r , φ) (reinstating the normalization factor A), the total quantum volume (probability) of the region is:
In other words, probabilities of future events (i.e. of configurations which have a record) cannot exceed the probability of the past events (of the records). Also, in the limit in which the amplitude W (φ r , φ) completely concentrates on M (r) we obtain the equality in (20) , which thus just says that the probability is conserved. If one were to restrict oneself to the semi-classical regime, this limit indicates that there there is very little volume around extremal curves from φ r to φ for φ ∈ M (r) , relative to those curves that end in φ ∈ M (r) . The weights of each Without getting into the intricacies of coarse-grainings of configuration space, I would like to speculate on a parallel with a well-known heuristic example in the study of entropy: suppose that φ r contains a broken egg. If φ represents a configuration with that same egg 22 unbroken (still connected to φ r by an extremal curve), small deviations in initial velocity of configurational change at φ r will result in a a final configuration very much different (very far from) φ. In other words, the harder it is to "un-brake" an egg, the more the volume inequality (20) will saturate and the more accurate the conservation of probability will become. In this spirit, I would thus suggest a connection between the notion of records proposed here and a notion of an entropic arrow of Time.
The recovery of Time I believe that indeed, it is difficult to assign meaning to some future configuration q in the timeless context. Instead, what we do, is to compare expectations 'now', with retrodictions, which are embedded in our records, or memories. When we have a record at q, then q r itself acquires meaning. Accordingly, records imbue W (q r , q) with stronger epistemological status.
Furthermore, it is easy to show that when q 1 is a record of q 2 and there is a unique classical path between the two configurations, then the entire path has an ordering of records. Namely, parametrizing the path, γ(t), such that γ(0) = q 1 , γ(t * ) = q 2 , then γ(t) is a record of γ(t ) iff t < t . This finally gives us back a complete notion of history, which is recovered only in the complete classical limit! This retrodiction aspect begs for a Bayesian treatment of probabilities, which works well (but we leave this analysis for the appendix D).
If there is nothing to empirically distinguish between our normal view of history -as having actually happened -on one hand, and the tight correlation between the present and the embedded past on the other, why should we give more credence to the former interpretation? Bayesian analysis can pinpoint no pragmatic distinction, and I see no reasons for preferring one over the other, except psychological ones.
What are we afraid of ?
What usually unsettles people -including me -about this view is the damage it does to the idea of a continuous conscious self. The egalitarian status of each and all instantaneous configurations of the Universe -carrying on their backs our own present conscious states -raises alarms in our heads. Could it be that each instant exists only unto itself, that all our myriad instantaneous states of mind exist separately? This proposal appears to conflict with the narrative we have construed of our selves -of having a continuously evolving and self-determining conscious experience.
But perhaps, upon reflection, it shouldn't bother us as much as it does. First of all, the so-called Block Time view of the self does not leave us in much better shape in certain respects of this problem. After all, the general relativistic worldline does not imply an 'evolving now' -it implies a collection of them, corresponding to the entire worldline. For the (idealized) worldline of a conscious being, each element of this collection will have its own, unique, instantaneous experience.
Nonetheless, in at least one respect, the worldline view still seems to have one advantage over the one presented in this paper. Even in the classical limit -for which aspects of a one-parameter family of configurations becomes embedded in a 'now' -the presented view still appears more fractured, more disconnected, less linear than the worldline view. We start off with a one-parameter family of individual conscious experiences, and, like Zeno, we imagine that an inverse limiting procedure focusing on the 'now' will eventually tear one configuration from the 'next', leaving us stranded in the 'now', separated from the rest of configuration space by an infinitesimal chasm. This is what I mean here by 'solipsism of the instant'. In the first subsection of this section, I will explain how this intuitive understanding can only find footing in a particular choice of (non-metric) topology for configuration space. That topology is not compatible with our starting point of applying differential geometry to configuration space.
The entirety of our intuitive dumbfoundness concerning our individual experiences however, is predicated on the belief that we know what a continuous self really means. In fact, it is not easy to put our finger on the meaning of this assumption. Moreover, there absolutely are meanings which are compatible with the notion arrived at here. This is what I discuss in the second subsection.
Zeno's paradox and solipsism of the instant: a matter of topology
It might not seem like it, but the discussion about whether we have a 'a collection of individual instants' as opposed to 'a continuous curve of instants' hinges, albeit disguisedly, on the topology we assume for configuration space. Our modern dismissal of Zeno's paradox relies on the calculus concept of a limit. But in fact, a limit point in a topological space first requires the notion of topology: a limit point of a set C in a topological space X is a point p ∈ X (not necessarily in C) that can be "approximated" by points of C in the sense that every neighborhood of p with respect to the topology on X also contains a point of C other than p itself.
In the finest topology -the discrete topology -each subset is declared to be open. On the real line, this would imply that every point is an open set. Let us call an abstract pre-curve in X the image of an injective mapping from R (endowed with the usual metric topology) to the set X. Thus no pre-curve on X can be continuous if X is endowed with the finest topology. Because the mapping is injective, the inverse of each point of its image (which is an open set in the topology of X) is a single point in R, which is not an open set in the standard metric topology of R. Likewise, with the finest topology, Zeno's argument becomes inescapable -when every point is an open set, there are no limit points and one indeed cannot hop continuously from one point to the next. We are forever stuck 'here', wherever here is.
In my opinion, the idea that Zeno and Parmenides were inductively aiming at was precisely that of a discrete topology, where there is a void between any two given points in the real line. If X is taken to be configuration space, this absolute "solipsism of the instant" would indeed incur on the conclusions of the Eleatics, and frozen time would necessarily follow. However, the finest topology cannot be obtained by inductively refining metric topologies.
With a more appropriate, e.g. metric, topology, we can only iteratively get to open neighborhoods of a point, neighborhoods which include a continuous number of other configurations. That means for example that smooth functions on configuration space, like P (q), are too blunt an instrument -in practice its values cannot be used to distinguish individual points. No matter how accurately we measure things, there will always be open sets whose elements we cannot parse.
The point being that with an appropriate topology we can have timelessness in a brander version than the Eleatics, even assuming that reality is entirely contained in configuration space without any absolute time. With an appropriate coarser (e.g. metric) topology on configuration space, we do not have to worry about a radical "solipsism of the instant": in the classical limit there are continuous curves interpolating between a record and a record-holding configuration. I can safely assume that there is a continuous sequence of configurations connecting me eating that donut this morning to this present moment of reminiscence. This is all that we can ask for to forbid 'gaps' in our experience. David Hume, wrote in " A Treatise of Human Nature" that when we start introspecting, "we are never intimately conscious of anything but a particular perception; man is a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed one another with an inconceivable rapidity and are in perpetual flux and movement.". Indeed, the notion of self, and continuity of the self, are elusive upon introspection. I believe, following Locke, that our self is determined biologically by patterns in our neural connections. Like any other physical structure, under normal time evolution these patterns are subject to change. What we consider to be a 'self' or a 'personality', is inextricably woven with the notion of continuity of such patterns in (what we perceive as) time. Yes, these patterns may change, but they do so continuously. It is this continuity which allows us to recognize a coherent identity.
In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit puts these intuitions to the test. He asks the reader to imagine entering a "teletransporter" a machine that puts you to sleep, then destroys you, copying the information of your molecular structure and then relaying it to Mars at the speed of light. On Mars, another machine re-creates you, each atom in exactly the same relative position to all the other ones. Parfit poses the question of whether or not the teletransporter is a method of travel -is the person on Mars the same person as the person who entered the teletransporter on Earth? Certainly, when waking up on Mars, you would feel like being you, you would remember entering the teletransporter in order to travel to Mars, you would also remember eating that donut this morning.
Following this initial operation, the teletransporter on Earth is modified to not destroy the person who enters it. Each replica left on Earth would claim to be you, and also remember entering the teletransporter, and then getting out again, still on Earth. Using thought experiments such as these, Parfit argues that any criteria we attempt to use to determine sameness of personal identity will be lacking. What matters, to Parfit, is simply what he calls "Relation R": psychological connectedness, including memory, personality, and so on. This is also my view, at least intellectually if not intuitively. And it applies to configuration space and the general relativistic worldline in the same way as it does in Parfit's description. In our case there exists a past configuration, represented (but not contained) in configuration 'now' in the form of a record. This past configuration has in it neural patterns that bear a strong resemblance to neural patterns contained in configuration 'now'. Crucially, these two configurations are connected by continuous extremal paths in configuration space, ensuring that indeed we can act as if they are psychologically connected. We can, and should, act as if one classically evolved from the other; our brain states are consistent with the evolved relations between all subsystems out there in the world that we can access. Furthermore, I would have a stronger Relation R with what I associate with future configurations of my (present) neural networks, than to other brain configurations (e.g. associated to other people). There seems to be no further reason for this conclusion to upset us, beyond those reasons that already make us uncomfortable with Parfit's thought experiment.
Conclusions
The idea of timelessness is certainly counter-intuitive.
But our own personal histories can indeed be pieced together from the static landscape of configuration space. Such histories are indiscernible from, but still somehow feel less real than our usual picture of our pasts. Even more than the worldline view of the self, the individual existence of every instant still seems to leave holes in the integrity of our life histories. This feeling is due to our faulty intuitions about the topology of configuration space.
Nonetheless, even after ensuring mathematical continuity of our notion of history, the idea of timelessness and of all possible states of being threatens the ingrained feeling that we are self-determiningsince all these alternatives exist timelessly, how do we determine our future? But this is a hollow threat. Forget about timelessness; free will and personal identity are troublesome concepts all on their own, we should not fear doing them damage. I like to compare these concepts to mythical animals: Nessie, Bigfoot, unicorns and the like. They are constructs of our minds, and -apart from blurry pictures -shall always elude close enough inspection. Crypto-zoologists notwithstanding, Unicorns are not an endangered species. We need not be overly concerned about encroaching on their natural habitat.
Crippling Time "Time does not exist. There is just the furniture of the world that we call instants of time.
Something as final as this should not be seen as unexpected. I see it as the only simple and plausible outcome of the epic struggle between the basic principles of quantum mechanics and general relativity. For the one -on its standard form at least -needs a definite time, but the other denies it. How can theories with such diametrically opposed claims coexist peacefully? They are like children squabbling over a toy called time. Isn't the most effective way to resolve such squabbles to remove the toy?" [22] Loosely following the Eleatic view of the special ontological status of the present, here we have carved Time away from spacetime, being left with timeless configuration space as a result. If Time is the legs which carries space forward, we might seem to have emerged from this operation with a severely handicapped Universe.
The criticism is to the point. Even if Time does not exist as a separate entity in the Universe, our conception of it needs to be recovered somehow. If there is no specific variable devoted to measuring time, it needs to be recovered from relational properties of configurations. This essay showed that this can be done.
Rehabilitating Time The plan was to recover Time by using a semi-classical approximation of a fundamentally timeless quantum mechanics theory in configuration space. Mathematically, before all else we need to find a way to breath life into the configuration space propagator, W (q 1 , q 2 ), by defining a second configuration other than any present configuration, 'now'. This first step was accomplished by defining a preferred configuration q * , playing a role similar to the quantum mechanical 'vacuum'. It is preferred in that it is the most structureless point of reduced configuration space, and it is also the configuration representing the " pointiest corner" of configuration space. The precise choice of q * depends both on the topology of the spatial manifold M and on the relational symmetry group at hand. For the case of M = S 3 and the symmetry group Diff(M ) C, q * is represented by (the orbit of) the round metric on S 3 . With the introduction of the preferred 'in' configuration, we defined a positive scalar density (a volume form, or probability density) on configuration space, P (q)Dq, given by the transition probability from the vacuum to the given configuration. Restrictions of locality (see [13] ) and factorization properties (required to make V (q) compatible with the later introduction of records), limit our choices, leading us to conjecture that we can recover the Born form, P (q) = |W (q * , q)| 2 . But in any case, this state of affairs is still not completely satisfactory. The number |W (q * , q)| 2 , which makes reference to some quantum mechanical vacuum state, or " preferred initial configuration", is too removed from everyday practice of physics, and it seems to say nothing about why I believe I really had a donut this morning. To get around this, we need the emergence of records which are more local (in configuration space). In the semi-classical path integral representation, there indeed exists such a candidate object to play this role. We have named this object a semi-classical record (or just a record here).
If q r is the record possessed by the configuration 'now', q, then W (q r , q) can encode our immediate pasts, through a correlation of amplitudes. The probability of q becomes the conditional probability of q given q r , P (q) = P (q|q r )P (q r ). Time emerges as something that we infer from the present. Its emergence requires a shift from the notion of "state" (or spacetime) to that of "process", between a record and the present. Since all subsystems of the configuration evolve to the same tune along an extremal path, relations between these subsystems may be intelligible and consistent.
This timeless picture requires a Bayesian approach to science, which I briefly discuss in the appendix D. In certain circumstances, all of the configurations between q r and q will themselves define an ordering of records, completely reproducing our notion of continuous history. In such cases, each previous run of an experiment is encoded in each posterior run. This feature gives us access to frequentist approaches to probabilities, even though we only have access to configuration 'now'. The equations emerging for a Bayesian treatment for the fitness of a given theory are identical to the usual, timeful ones, as was shown in [14] .
The more records a certain configuration has, the more data one has to test their theories. Consistency of multiple records within a given configuration increases our level of confidence in a theory, and inconsistency decreases it, as expected. The more such types of consistent structure a configuration has, the more we will have perceived time to have passed. In other words, an arrow of time points from q * -the most symmetric configuration -to ones that have consistent records.
Regarding duration, unlike GR -where proper time is intrinsic to the worldline itself -duration needs to be defined as a measure of local change in conformal geometry. 23 We have gone from the picture of a Universe that limps, to one that lilts, conducted by the complex structures present in configuration space.
Relationalism and Laws of the Instant Looking for a theory that will allow a more natural description of unitarity, probability, and superposition, we are led to require of it no external input other than what is contained in configuration space itself. Interestingly, this demand puts severe restrictions on the types of symmetries that can exist. Namely, we only allow those symmetries whose action depends solely on the configuration on which it is acting. The ones that obey these restrictions we call 'Laws of the Instant".
Had we allowed symmetries which are not 'Laws of the Instant', the transition amplitude would not have been a well-defined object by itself, and records would not be invariant under such symmetries, thus losing objective meaning. Fortuitously, we find that the most general Laws of the Instant are those that indeed embody the full gamut of relational symmetries.
I want to repeat once more that the theory of general relativity does not accommodate all manifestations of spacetime relationalism. In particular, it does not incorporate relationalism of scale: the theory is not conformally invariant (unlike its unitarily-challenged cousin, conformal gravity). In a 3+1 formulation, general relativity still does not respect the Laws of the Instant; refoliations are not intrinsic to configuration space.
Spatially relational theories also have better control over questions of unitarity (unlike conformal gravity), and have the correct number of degrees of freedom (unlike Horava gravity), although we have said little in these directions here. Not to mention that configuration space only has a principal fiber bundle structure for symmetry groups which are 'Laws of the Instant', and this is a useful structure to have for explicitly writing the path integral [15] .
Actions which represent completely spatially relational theories would be the ones suggested by the principles expounded on in this paper. The challenge is to find ones which are also in accord with experiment. From these principles, the derivation of shape dynamics, with its non-local Hamiltonian and preferred Time, is without a doubt overly contrived, and requires a detour through general relativistic territory. In the future, we need to investigate the phenomenology of the more natural relational model, given by (34) in the appendix. That is the classical theory suggested by the principles expounded on in this paper. 23 Not only is this possible, but it has been done for one theory that is not intrinsically formulated in spacetime. In [23, 12] , it was shown that weak matter perturbations evolving through standard unitary Hamiltonian evolution in shape dynamics, will perceive conformal geometry change -or duration -in the exact proportion to rebuild an Einstein spacetime (in a particular foliation, called CMC). 24 The most general local model obeying the Laws of the Instant which are second order in time derivatives also can admit a potential term which is a function of the Chern-Simons functional. Thus (34) is the simplest action without a potential, i.e. that can be written as a geodesic in conformal superspace [15] . Unfortunately for the program, it seems likely that it will yield different experimental predictions than general relativity.
What gives, Wheeler's quip or superpositions? Neither, really.
Perhaps our shortcomings in the discovery of a viable theory of quantum gravity are telling us that spacetime is the obstacle. Though at first sight we are indeed mutilating the beautiful unity of space and time, this split should not be seen as a step back from Einstein's insights. I believe the main insight of general relativity, contained in Wheeler's sentence (1) , is about the dynamism of space and time themselves. There is no violence being done to this insight here.
Spatial geometry appears dynamic -it warps and bends throughout evolution whenever we are in the classical regime. Regarding the dynamism of Time, the notion of 'duration' is emergent from relational properties of space. Thus duration too, is dynamic and space-dependent.
Nonetheless, all relational properties are encoded in the static landscape of configuration space. The point is that this landscape is full of hills and valleys, dictated by the preferred volume form that sits on top of it. From the way that the volume form distributes itself on configuration space, certain classical field histories -special curves in configuration space -can give a thorough illusion of change. I have argued that this illusion is indistinguishable from how we perceive motion, history, and time.
Moreover, with regards to the quantum mechanics adage, the processes W (q r , q) straightforwardly embody "everything that can happen, does happen". The concept of superposition of causal structures (or even that of superposition of geometries), is to be replaced by interference between paths in configuration space. Those same hills and valleys in configuration space that encode classical field histories reveal the valleys and troughs of interference patterns. A very shallow valley around a point -for example representing an experimental apparatus and a fluorescent dot on a given point on a screenindicates the scarcity of observers sharing that observation. By looking at the processes between records and record-holding configurations, we can straightforwardly make sense of interference, or lack thereof, between (coarse-grained) histories of the Universe.
In all honesty, I don't know if formulating a theory in which space and time appear dynamical, and in which we can give precise meaning to superpositions of alternative histories, is enough to quantize gravity. Although the foundations seem solid, the proof is in the pudding, and we must further investigate tests for these ideas.
But I also don't believe that dropping Time from the picture is abdicating hard-won knowledge about spacetime. Indeed, we can recover a notion of history, we can implement strict relationalism, we transfigure the 'measurement problem', and we can make sense of a union of the principles of quantum mechanics and geometrodynamics.
25
It seems to me that there are many emotions against this resolution, but very few arguments; as I said at the beginning of these conclusions, accepting timelessness is deeply counter-intuitive. But such a resolution would necessarily change only how we view reality, while still being capable of fully accounting for how we experience it. The consequences for quantum gravity still need to be unraveled. Even at the classical level, from our search for a natural action embodying timelessness we were led to (34), a theory that now needs to be phenomenologically investigated. But this whole approach should be seen as a framework, not as a particular theory. And indeed, in the non-relativistic regime of quantum mechanics, we are not looking for new experiences of reality, but rather for new ways of viewing the ones we can already predict, a new framework to interpret them with. This is the hallmark of a philosophical insight, albeit in the present case one heavily couched on physics. As Wittgenstein once said: "Once the new way of thinking has been established, the old problems vanish; indeed they become hard to recapture. For they go with our way of expressing ourselves and, if we clothe ourselves in a new form of expression, the old problems are discarded along with the old garment." APPENDIX A Timeless quantum mechanics, the canonical theory Configuration space, M, is coordinitized by q a , for a = 1, · · · , n. An observation yields a complete set of q a , which is called an event. Ω = T * M is the cotangent bundle to configuration space, with coordinates q a and their momenta p a . The classical dynamics is fully determined once one fixes the Hamiltonian constraint surface in Ω, given by H = 0, where H : Ω → R k is the Hamiltonian of the system. If k = 1, then we have a single Hamiltonian constraint, whose action only generates reparametrizations of curves in phase space, if k > 1, then we have further gauge-invariance.
A curve γ ∈ M is a physical motion connecting the events q a 1 and q a 2 if there exists an unparametrized curveγ in T * M such that the following action is extremized:
for curves lying on the constraint surface H(q a , p a ) = 0, and are such thatγ's projection to M connects q a 1 and q a 2 . By parametrizing the curve with a parameter τ , we get the familiar form:
where the N i are Lagrange multipliers. One can now define the fundamental transition amplitudes between configuration eigenstates:
whereP is the "evolution operator":P := dτ e −iτĤ (24) whereĤ is the canonically quantized (with Weyl ordering) Hamiltonian. Note that since one integrates over all τ , the projector is parametrization independent. To obtain physical states, one need still use the quantization of the constraints, as in (7):Ĥ |ψ = 0 (25)
We will for now implicitly consider the case of a single constraint, H : Ω → R. Given two regions in configuration space, R 1 , R 2 , we have that the probability of an observation in R 2 given an observation in R 1 is:
where
Standard non-relativistic quantum mechanics through deparametrizable systems
If one can single out a degree of freedom to parametrize motion on a whole region of configuration space, we can write q a = (t, q i ), in which case one gets a momenta conjugate to time and writes H(t, q i , p t , p i ) = p t + H o (t, q i , p i ). In this case, by inserting a decomposition of the identity in terms of eigenstates p t and E ofp t andĤ o , one obtains:
2 ) is the usual transition amplitude in quantum mechanics.
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26 As much as possible, I want to avoid technicalities which won't be required here. Having said this, formally one would have had to define the so-called kinematical Hilbert space K for the quantum states over M by using a Gelfand triple over M with measure d d q a = dq 1 · · · dq d , i.e. S ⊂ K ⊂ S . This is not necessary in my case, because we will not require a Hilbert space, as we will see. 27 One should be careful to note however, that in standard non-relativistic quantum theory, time is not an operator, and thus ∆t = 0, i.e. measurements are made at a specific instant. Thus, although at the level of transition amplitudes,
Gauge transformations
The presence of more than one constraint, i.e. H : Ω → R k , indicates further gauge symmetries of the system. In this case we must impose all of the respective equations (25) simultaneously, which generally is difficult. When the the commutation of the constraints form a true Lie Algebra:
i.e. when f ij k have no phase space-dependence, different methods can be used to find the projection onto the physical states, the most straightforward of which is called 'group-averaging' [25] . This consists in integrating over the group:
where dµ is the Haar measure, which is translation invariant. In the more general case, this technique will in general incur in anomalies.
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B Relational symmetries and laws of the instant
In the case at hand, suppose that the transformations in phase space are given by a Hamiltonian vector field, associated to a smeared functional F [g, π, η], polynomial in its variables. For this to have an action on configuration space that is independent of the momenta, F [g, π, η] must be linear in the momenta. This already severely restricts the forms of the functional to
where F 1 (g, η) ab must be a covariant tensor of rank two. If F 1 has no derivatives of the metric, it will straightforwardly commute. But with no derivatives the only objects we can form are:
In the first case, these are just conformal transformations, in the second, they would imply that π ab = 0, a constraint killing any possibility of dynamics, which is still consistent (also consistent with the strictly Eleatic Universe).
The point now is to show that only with one derivative -which implies a Lie derivative for a covariant object -they still weakly commute. With more derivatives of the metric, the conjecture is that one does not close the algebra. For example,
it is straightforward but tedious to show that the algebra does not close for any values of α and β. If one instead chose a term of the form βRη ab one can show that the rank of this constraint is not constant along phase space. Furthermore, it implies that almost everywhere π ab = 0, as before. The conjecture is that these conclusions hold order by order in number of derivatives of the metric.
One could also impose a more stringent definition of 'law of the instant' , as acting independently on both metric and momenta. Of course, the proof is much more straightforward then, yielding:
equation (23) for deparametrizable systems reproduces G(t 1 , q i 2 , t 2 , q i 2 ), the probabilities for measurements performed with some inaccuracy ∆t in the time variable need not match. The basic reason is that according to (26) , one sums over the transition amplitudes first, and then one takes the squared norm. Thus they are summed interferentially. For standard quantum mechanics with time dependence, one takes the squared norm at each instant and then integrates over the time taken by the measurement. The temporal resolution ∆t necessary for a good agreement between the two theories was studied in [24] for simple systems. 28 In the more general case one should use BRST techniques, but in the Lie groupoid case -i.e. when the structure constants depend on the fields, f ij k (q, p) -is still much more problematic, as one has a BRST charge that is not (usually) of rank 1 in ghost momenta [26] .
where exp dτ ξ(τ ) represents the flow of the vector field part of ξ(t) and the usual exponential of an infinitesimal Weyl transformation, and the · denotes the respective group action. On the metric, this action is by pull-back for the diffeomorphisms and pointwise multiplication for Weyl, and for the momenta it is by inverse of the push-forward for the diffeomorphisms and the inverse scalar multiplication for Weyl [18] .
The further issue with the refoliation constraint, is that it only forms a true equivalence relation on-shell. That is, suppose g 
This is what is meant by saying that the Hamiltonian constraint in ADM gravity [5] generates space-time refoliations only on-shell. It means we can only have an equivalence relation under very special circumstances -of equality between fields which do not depend exclusively on the configurations g
themselves. This conclusion also has implications for the locality of the field theory, as discussed in [13] .
B.1 Configuration space metrics
Superspace One nice thing about the space of metrics is that itself comes with a supermetric, defined, for v , w ∈ T g M, at the base point g ab ∈ M by:
This supermetric induces a metric topology on M. 30 Furthermore, the inner product (30) is invariant wrt to diffeomorphisms acting through pull-back. That is, the directions along the diffeomorphism orbits in M are Killing wrt the metric (30) (see [27] ).
Conformal Superspace However, the supermetric (30) is not invariant wrt conformal transformations, because of the presence of √ g. Thus we construct:
where C ab is the Cotton-York tensor, which is both traceless and transverse, and has the correct conformal weight for the inner product to be conformally invariant.
B.1.1 Examples of relational conformal geoemetrodynamical theories
Let me exemplify the constructions above with two different actions. The first is that of shape dynamics, and is given in Hamiltonian form by
where L ξ denotes the Lie derivative, and φ o is defined implicitly from the modified Lichnerowicz-York equation [28] : 29 In fact, it comes with a one-parameter family of supermetrics, where we substitute g ac g bd → g ac g bd + λg ab g cd . This supermetric however is only positive for λ > −1/3. Note also that we are not symmetrizing the DeWitt supermetric because we are assuming that it is acting on tangent vectors of M, which are already symmetric.
30 More formally, one would work with what is called a weak Whitney topology, which roughly is a norm on the jet bundles of the sections. We will ignore these more formal aspects here.
The problem with (32) is that it can be put in this form only when it is deparametrizable (see [17] ). Otherwise, one must use not the full group of scale transformations as symmetries, but only those that preserve the total volume of space. I.e. instead of ρπ ab g ab one must use (ρ − ρ )π ab g ab where
This is a non-local restriction, and is hard to make sense of from a purely relational manner. The second action is given in its Lagrangian Jacobi form (see [28, 15] ): We have the reparametrization and conformal-diffeomorphism invariant geodesic action:
where ξ a and ρ are the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to diffeomorphisms and conformal transformations, respectively.
To stress, this is a fully conformal diffeomorphism invariant action with the same physical degrees of freedom as general relativity, but which does not have local refoliation invariance, only a global reparametrization one. Equation (34) is furthermore a purely geodesic-type action in Riem, with just one global lapse and thus one global notion of time, as such it also possesses inherent value in a relationalist setting. Classical solutions are one-parameter collections of conformal geometries, which extremize the total length according to a given supermetric (31). Although this theory is completely relational -it is not yet clear whether it will reproduce standard tests of general relativity, and more analysis is required.
In [15] we formulate the theory in a given parameter gauge given by arc-length (in superspace metric). In this gauge, one can ask: are the propagation equations for fields hyperbolic? I.e. do they contain the same number of space and time derivatives. If they don't, then the velocity of a such a field can depend on the velocity of the source, and the energy wrt the source. In the case of that exemple, the equations for electrogmanetism seem to be constrained to be hyperbolic, but not the gravitational ones, it seems, at least in this gauge. In any case, I think there are two distinct questions: can one somehow detect a preferred reference frame? To which I believe the answer is "no", if we have no time but only abstract duration from change. And a second question is: do the relative velocity of massless fields depend on their energy relative to source and sink? These are all matters that require further investigation.
As a last comment, I address a usual concern: we never know our metric configuration with infinite precision. That is true. To deal with this, one should use not the usual configuration space, but an effective one. For instance, one which only takes into account eigenmodes of the Laplacian at each point above a certain cut-off. Of course, one should then use the effective action to that scale, as opposed to the bare action above. These issues are briefly discussed in [13] .
C Preferred coarse-grainings and records
The following definitions are taken from [14] . They assume that configuration space (or reduced configuration space) possesses a metric, with respect to which one can define tubular neighborhoods of given radii around non-intersecting paths. Γ(φ * , φ) is the space of unparametrized paths between φ * and φ. A tubular neighborhood of a given path γ in M is roughly a small enough tube around γ such that the tube doesn't self-intersect. More precisely, a tubular neighborhood of a submanifold L embedded in a Riemannian manifold N is a diffeomorphism between the normal bundle of L and an open set of N , for which the zero section reduces to the identity on L. One first defines the exponential map (that the exponential map is still well defined in the infinite-dimensional setting is shown in [27] ), Exp : T M → M. Restricting the exponential map to the normal bundle of γ (i.e. to act only on vectors orthogonal to γ ), Exp : (T γ) ⊥ ⊂ M → M, since γ is compact, one can always find a maximum radius ρ max such that there are no self-intersections of the tubular neighborhood, i.e. Exp is a diffeomorphism between (T γ) ⊥ ρmax (normal vectors with maximal length ρ max ) and its image in M. Defining coarse-grained histories between two configurations φ * and φ f , requires us to first define a collection of subsets of Γ(φ * , φ f ), {C α , α ∈ Λ}. The amplitude kernel for C α is:
Using the configuration space metric (which defines extremal paths as geodesics), we have the orthogonal plane P := (T γ cl ) ⊥ . A basis for all the deviation vector fields from the classical path, X ∈ X, can be formed by all the vectors in P .
Thus, for each deviation vector field X ∈ P from γ cl , we can form the one-parameter family of paths γ X (u) given by γ X (u, t) := γ cl (t) + Exp γ cl (t) (uX(t))
where X(t) ∈ P γ cl (t) . We define the set of coarse-grained paths seeded by γ α cl with radius ρ as:
this is a particular set of paths; not defined by "all those that don't enter the region". It thus avoids criticisms of Halliwell regarding the definition of coarse-grainings by "crossing properties of regions of space-time (here, configuration space)", [?] . We already have a ρ max given above by the no-intersection criterion. Now, to define the minimum one, we consider the partial transition amplitude:
Now, by the results of [29] , if there is a single extremal path γ cl between φ i , φ f , there exists a small enough radius such that
where the approximation works up to orders of 2 . Now, of course, for a large enough ρ, the partial amplitude stops approximating the full amplitude. It is no longer a good sampling of all the paths, e.g. the exponential might even cease being a local diffeomorphism. It might not be able to detect a second extremal path away from γ cl for example, since it does not comprise all possible variations there. This is represented by the fact that for higher order of approximations one requires higher order of derivatives of S[γ cl ].
Since in practice we don't have access to the full path integral, only to approximations, we should be content in having not an absolute minimum radius, but an optimal radius only up to some order of approximation:
roughly, assuming that at some point the error starts increasing with ρ (for instance, at some point the Riemann exponential map might even cease to be a diffeomorphism), this should be the largest radius, if it exists, such that |W α,ρ (φ i , φ f ) − W (φ i , φ f )| ∼ O( 2 ). Now we define Definition 1 (Extremal coarse-grainings (ECs)) An -exhaustive extremal coarse-graining for the paths in Γ(φ * , φ) is a coarse-graining {C Heuristically, the width of the coarse grainings around an extremal path should be wide enough so that the total amplitude is approximated to the order of some formal parameter (usually taken to be ). For 1 << S γ cl / the amplitude is carried by a tight bundle of paths around each classical path, not posing a tight constraint on the width of the coarse-graining.
Records are then defined as:
Definition 2 (Semi-classical record (single segmented)) Given an initial configuration φ * , φ and {C α } α∈I the -extremal coarse graining (def. 1) between φ * and φ, of radii ρ α min given in (40), we will say φ holds a (single-segmented) semi-classical record of a field configuration φ r to order , if φ r is contained in every C α . (see figure 1 below) .
With these definitions, it can be shown [14] that Figure 1 : An extremal coarse-graining between φ * and φ in configuration space M, consisting of the elements C 1 and C 2 , seeded by the extremal paths γ 1 , γ 2 , with radius ρ min . Here φ contains a single segmented semi-classical record of φ r (see [14] ).
D Bayesian analysis
Let us call 'an observation' E a property of correlations within a configuration. We call the manifold M (Eo) the manifold which has records of observation E o . Given a theory T i (where i indexes the theory we are discussing), the probability of observation E 1 is given by the relative volume of observers:
In Bayesian analysis we want to judge the ability of the theories to explain a given distribution of the observation given the theory This number is called the 'likelihood' of the theory T i given the observation of E. We want to compare the chances that we will find ourselves correlated with a "new" observation E 1 , according to the two distinct theories above. Assuming that (41) holds for E o and E 1 , that F factorizes according to (12) ,
and using Bayes rule, we can determine the posterior probability of the theory given the records E o and observation E 1 :
where P (E 1 |T i , E o ) is obtained from (42) by the replacement F i (φ) → F i (K(E o , φ)). It should be interpreted as the probability that you would find E 1 if T i is correct, and you have already 'observed' E o (it is a record). For configurations that have many records of properties of E we can -by just looking at these records -update the prior of the next (or present) such observation E n . This is the standard way in which we test our theories, nothing needs to change.
